what were to two sides being argued in the Miranda v. Arizona case?

1966 U.Due south. Supreme Courtroom case establishing the use of the Miranda warning

United states of america Supreme Court case

Miranda v. Arizona
Supreme Court of the United states of america
Argued February 28 – March 1, 1966 Decided June xiii, 1966
Full case name	Miranda v. Land of Arizona; Westover five. The states; Vignera v. State of New York; Country of California v. Stewart
Citations	384 U.S. 436 (more) 86 S. Ct. 1602; 16 Fifty. Ed. second 694; 1966 U.Due south. LEXIS 2817; x A.L.R.3d 974
Argument	Oral argument
Instance history
Prior	Defendant . Superior Ct.; affirmed, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965); cert. granted, 382 U.South. 925 (1965).
Subsequent	Retrial on remand, defendant convicted, Ariz. Superior Ct.; affirmed, 450 P.2d 364 (Ariz. 1969); rehearing denied, Ariz. Supreme Ct. March 11, 1969; cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
Holding
The Fifth Subpoena right against self incrimination requires police enforcement officials to advise a suspect interrogated in custody of their rights to remain silent and to obtain an attorney, at no charge if need be. Supreme Court of Arizona reversed and remanded.
Court membership
Chief Justice Earl Warren Associate Justices Hugo Black· William O. Douglas Tom C. Clark· John Thou. Harlan II William J. Brennan Jr.· Potter Stewart Byron White· Abe Fortas
Case opinions
Majority	Warren, joined by Black, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas
Agree/dissent	Clark
Dissent	Harlan, joined by Stewart, White
Dissent	White, joined by Harlan, Stewart
Laws practical
U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, Fourteen

Miranda 5. Arizona , 384 U.Due south. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Courtroom in which the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution restricts prosecutors from using a person's statements fabricated in response to interrogation in police custody as show at their trial unless they tin can prove that the person was informed of the right to consult with an chaser earlier and during questioning, and of the right against cocky-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived them.

Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, since the Fifth Amendment was traditionally understood simply to protect Americans against formal types of compulsion to confess, such as threats of contempt of court.^[1] It has had a significant impact on law enforcement in the Usa, by making what became known as the Miranda warning role of routine law procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights. But the concept of " Miranda warnings" apace caught on beyond American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing".

Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court determination Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010), criminal suspects who are aware of their right to silence and to an chaser, but choose not to "unambiguously" invoke them, may find whatsoever subsequent voluntary statements treated equally an implied waiver of their rights, and used as or every bit part of testify. At to the lowest degree one scholar has argued that Thompkins effectively gutted Miranda.^[two]

Background [edit]

Legal [edit]

During the 1960s, a motion which provided defendants with legal aid emerged from the collective efforts of various bar associations.

In the civil realm, it led to the creation of the Legal Services Corporation under the Groovy Guild program of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Escobedo v. Illinois, a case which closely foreshadowed Miranda, provided for the presence of counsel during police interrogation. This concept extended to a concern over police interrogation practices, which were considered by many^{[ who? ]} to be barbaric and unjust. Coercive interrogation tactics were known in period slang as the "3rd degree".^{[ citation needed ]}

Factual [edit]

On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested by the Phoenix Police Department, based on circumstantial show linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an eighteen-yr-onetime woman ten days before.^[three] Afterwards two hours of interrogation by law officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape accuse on forms that included the typed statement: "I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my ain complimentary will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used confronting me."^[four]

However, at no time was Miranda told of his correct to counsel. Before being presented with the form on which he was asked to write out the confession that he had already given orally, he was not advised of his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his statements during the interrogation would be used confronting him. At trial, when prosecutors offered Miranda'south written confession as evidence, his court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected that because of these facts, the confession was not truly voluntary and should exist excluded. Moore'due south objection was overruled, and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping. He was sentenced to 20–xxx years of imprisonment on each accuse, with sentences to run concurrently. Moore filed Miranda'south appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that Miranda'due south confession was not fully voluntary and should not have been admitted into the court proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court'due south decision to acknowledge the confession in Country 5. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965). In affirmation, the Arizona Supreme Court heavily emphasized the fact that Miranda did not specifically asking an chaser.^[5]

Chaser John Paul Frank, sometime police force clerk to Justice Hugo Black, represented Miranda in his appeal to the U.Southward. Supreme Court.^[6] Gary K. Nelson represented Arizona.

Supreme Court decision [edit]

On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court issued a v–iv decision in Miranda's favor that overturned his conviction and remanded his case back to Arizona for retrial.

Stance of the Court [edit]

5 justices formed the majority and joined an stance written by Chief Justice Earl Warren.^[7] The Court ruled that because of the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police (Warren cited several law training manuals that had non been provided in the arguments), no confession could be admissible nether the 5th Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect has been made aware of his rights and the suspect has so waived them:

The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, exist clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the correct to consult with a lawyer and to accept the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will exist appointed to represent him.^[viii]

Thus, Miranda'due south conviction was overturned. The Court also fabricated articulate what must happen if a suspect chooses to exercise his or her rights:

If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is nowadays. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the chaser and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.

Justice Brennan's comments on the Miranda decision.

Warren likewise pointed to the existing procedures of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which required informing a doubtable of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, provided free of accuse if the doubtable was unable to pay. If the doubtable requested counsel, "the interview is terminated." Warren included the FBI'due south four-page brief in his opinion.^[ix]

However, the dissenting justices accused the majority of overreacting to the problem of coercive interrogations, and anticipated a desperate issue. They believed that, in one case warned, suspects would ever demand attorneys, and deny the police the ability to proceeds confessions.

Clark's concurrence in office, dissent in function [edit]

In a separate concurrence in part, dissent in part, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the Warren Court went "too far too fast." Instead, Justice Clark would utilize the "totality of the circumstances" exam enunciated by Justice Goldberg in Haynes 5. Washington. Nether this test, the court would:

consider in each instance whether the law officer prior to custodial interrogation added the warning that the suspect might accept counsel present at the interrogation and, further, that a court would appoint one at his request if he was too poor to employ counsel. In the absenteeism of warnings, the burden would exist on the Country to prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that in the totality of the circumstances, including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary.

Harlan'south dissent [edit]

In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan Two wrote that "nil in the letter of the alphabet or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and 1-sided action that is and so precipitously taken by the Court in the proper name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities." Harlan closed his remarks by quoting old Justice Robert H. Jackson: "This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of ramble law, and the temples take a way of collapsing when one story too many is added."

White's dissent [edit]

Justice Byron White took upshot with the court having announced a new ramble right when it had no "factual and textual bases" in the Constitution or previous opinions of the Court for the dominion announced in the opinion. He stated: "The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a articulate waiver of counsel has no pregnant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the 5th Amendment." White did not believe the right had whatsoever basis in English language common law.

White farther warned of the dire consequences of the majority opinion:

I have no desire whatever to share the responsibility for whatsoever such impact on the present criminal process. In some unknown number of cases, the Courtroom's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, in that location will non be a proceeds, simply a loss, in human dignity.

Subsequent developments [edit]

Retrial [edit]

Miranda was retried in 1967 after the original case against him was thrown out. This time the prosecution, instead of using the confession, introduced other evidence and called witnesses. One witness was Twila Hoffman, a woman with whom Miranda was living at the time of the offense; she testified that he had told her of committing the law-breaking.^{[ten] [11]} Miranda was convicted in 1967 and sentenced to serve 20 to thirty years.^[xi] The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed,^[12] and the Us Supreme Court denied review.^[13] Miranda was paroled in 1972. Afterwards his release, he returned to his erstwhile neighborhood and made a pocket-sized living autographing police officers' "Miranda cards" that contained the text of the alert for reading to arrestees. Miranda was stabbed to expiry during an argument in a bar on January 31, 1976.^[xiv] A doubtable was arrested, merely due to a lack of evidence against him, he was released.^[fifteen]

Another three defendants whose cases had been tied in with Miranda'southward – an armed robber, a stick-upward man, and a bank robber – either made plea bargains to lesser charges or were plant guilty again despite the exclusion of their confessions.^[16]

Reaction [edit]

The Miranda decision was widely criticized when it came down, every bit many felt it was unfair to inform suspected criminals of their rights, every bit outlined in the decision. Richard Nixon and conservatives denounced Miranda for undermining the efficiency of the law, and argued the ruling would contribute to an increase in offense. Nixon, upon condign President, promised to engage judges who would reverse the philosophy he viewed as "soft on criminal offence." Many supporters of law enforcement were angered past the decision'due south negative view of police officers.^[17]

Miranda alarm [edit]

After the Miranda decision, the nation's police departments were required to inform arrested persons or suspects of their rights nether the ruling prior to custodial interrogation or their answers would not be admissible in court.^[xviii] Such information is called a Miranda warning. Since information technology is ordinarily required that the suspects be asked if they sympathise their rights, courts have besides ruled that whatsoever subsequent waiver of Miranda rights must exist knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.^[nineteen]

Many American law departments have pre-printed Miranda waiver forms that a suspect must sign and appointment (subsequently hearing and reading the warnings once more) if an interrogation is to occur.^{[20] [21]}

Information from the FBI Uniform Criminal offence Reports shows a sharp reduction in the clearance rate of trigger-happy and property crimes afterward Miranda.^[22] However, according to other studies from the 1960s and 1970s, "contrary to popular belief, Miranda had little, if whatever, upshot on detectives' ability to solve crimes."^[eleven]

Legal developments [edit]

The federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 purported to overrule Miranda for federal criminal cases and restore the "totality of the circumstances" test that had prevailed previous to Miranda.^[23] The validity of this provision of the law, which is all the same codified at 18 UsaC. § 3501, was non ruled on for another 30 years because the Justice Department never attempted to rely on it to back up the introduction of a confession into bear witness at whatever criminal trial.^{[ citation needed ]}

Miranda was undermined by several subsequent decisions that seemed to grant exceptions to the Miranda warnings, challenging the ruling'south claim to exist a necessary corollary of the Fifth Amendment. The exceptions and developments that occurred over the years included:

• The Court found in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), that a confession obtained in violation of the Miranda standards may however be used for purposes of impeaching the defendant's testimony; that is, if the defendant takes the stand up at trial and the prosecution wishes to introduce the defendant's confession as a prior inconsistent statement to assault the defendant's credibility, the Miranda holding will not prohibit this.
• The Court found in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), that a "spontaneous" statement fabricated by a defendant while in custody, even though the defendant has not been given the Miranda warnings or has invoked the right to counsel and a lawyer is not even so nowadays, is admissible in prove, every bit long as the statement was not given in response to law questioning or other conduct by the police likely to produce an incriminating response.
• The Court plant in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the crime of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested.
• The Courtroom found in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.South. 649 (1984), that in that location is too a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before questioning; for example, if the accused is in possession of information regarding the location of an unattended gun or there are other like exigent circumstances that require protection of the public, the defendant may be questioned without alarm and his responses, though incriminating, will be admissible in testify. In 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld the confidence of Richard Allen Davis, finding that the public-prophylactic exception applied despite the fact that 64 days had passed from the disappearance of the girl later found to be murdered.^[24]
• The Court found in Colorado five. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), that the words "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" hateful only that suspects reasonably announced to understand what they are doing and are not being coerced into signing the waiver; the Court ruled that it is irrelevant whether the suspect may actually have been cognitively or mentally impaired at the fourth dimension.

United States v. Garibay (1998) clarified an of import matter regarding the scope of Miranda. Defendant Jose Garibay barely spoke English language and clearly showed a lack of understanding; indeed, "the agent admitted that he had to rephrase questions when the defendant appeared confused."^[25] Because of the defendant's depression I.Q. and poor English-language skills, the U.Due south. Court of Appeals ruled that it was a "clear mistake" when the district court establish that Garibay had "knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights." The court investigated his waiver and discovered that it was missing all items for which they were looking: he never signed a waiver, he only received his warnings verbally and in English, and no interpreter was provided although they were available. With an stance that stressed "the requirement that a defendant 'knowingly and intelligently' waive his Miranda rights," the Courtroom reversed Garibay'south conviction and remanded his example.^[26]

Miranda survived a strong challenge in Dickerson v. Us, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), when the validity of Congress'due south overruling of Miranda through § 3501 was tested. At issue was whether the Miranda warnings were actually compelled past the Constitution, or were rather merely measures enacted as a thing of judicial policy.^{[ citation needed ]} In Dickerson, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld Miranda vii–ii and stated that "the warnings accept get part of our national culture". In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Miranda warnings were not constitutionally required. He cited several cases demonstrating a bulk of the and so-current courtroom, counting himself, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, also as Rehnquist (who had just delivered a opposite opinion), "[were] on tape as assertive that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution."^{[ citation needed ]}

Over time, interrogators began to devise techniques to honor the "letter" but not the "spirit" of Miranda.^{[ citation needed ]} In the example of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.Due south. 600 (2004), the Supreme Courtroom halted one of the more controversial practices. Missouri police force had been deliberately withholding Miranda warnings and questioning suspects until they obtained confessions, then providing the warnings, getting waivers, and eliciting confessions again. Justice Souter wrote for the plurality: "Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot achieve by training instructions what Dickerson held Congress could not practice past statute."^[27]

Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) was a ruling in which the Supreme Courtroom held that a suspect's "ambiguous or equivocal" statement, or lack of statements, does not mean that constabulary must stop an interrogation.^[28] At least one scholar has argued that Thompkins effectively gutted Miranda. In The Right to Remain Silent, Charles Weisselberg wrote that "the bulk in Thompkins rejected the fundamental underpinnings of Miranda v. Arizona's prophylactic rule and established a new one that fails to protect the rights of suspects" and that

But in Thompkins, neither Michigan nor the Solicitor General were able to cite any determination in which a courtroom found that a suspect had given an implied waiver after lengthy questioning. Thompkins persevered for nigh iii hours before succumbing to his interrogators. In finding a waiver on these facts, Thompkins gives us an implied waiver doctrine on steroids.^[two]

Effect on law enforcement [edit]

Miranda 's bear upon on law enforcement remains in dispute. Many legal scholars believe that law have adjusted their practices in response to Miranda and that its mandates have not hampered law investigations.^[29] Others argue that the Miranda rule has resulted in a lower charge per unit of conviction,^[30] with a possible reduction in the rate of confessions of between iv and 16 per centum.^[31] Some scholars debate that Miranda warnings have reduced the rate at which the police solve crimes,^[32] while others question their methodology and conclusions.^[33]

In popular culture [edit]

Miranda is mentioned, along with Escobedo five. Illinois, in the movie Dirty Harry, as well as in season five, episode fourteen of Kojak, entitled "Mouse," and the Miranda warning itself is also mentioned in countless movie and Tv set offense dramas and thrillers.

Run across besides [edit]

• U.s. constitutional criminal process
• List of criminal competencies
• List of United States Supreme Court cases, book 384
• Miranda warning
• Schmerber five. California
• Stansbury v. California
• R. 5. Hebert
• R. 5. Brydges

References [edit]

1. ^ Saltzburg & Capra (2018), p. 761.
2. ^ ^{a b} Charles Weisselberg and Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 69 (2010), Available at: http://scholarship.police.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2181 (Retrieved May 2, 2016)
3. ^ Miranda also matched the clarification given by a robbery victim of the perpetrator in a robbery several months before. He was simultaneously interrogated nigh both of these crimes, confessed to both, but was non asked to and did not write downwardly his confession to the robbery. He was separately tried and convicted of the robbery and sentenced to 20 to 25 years of imprisonment. This crime, trial, and sentence is dissever from the rape-kidnapping case appealed to the Supreme Court.
4. ^ Michael Due south. Lief and H. Mitchell Caldwell "'Yous Have the Right to Remain Silent,'" American Heritage, August/September 2006.
5. ^ Miranda's oral confession in the robbery instance was also appealed and the Arizona Supreme Court besides affirmed the trial conclusion to acknowledge it in State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 716. This case was not part of the entreatment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
6. ^ Oliver, Myrna (September 12, 2002). "John P. Frank, 84; Chaser Won Key Decision in 1966 Miranda Case". Los Angeles Times . Retrieved May 12, 2017.
7. ^ LaFave et al. (2015), § 6.5(b).
8. ^ Syllabus to the U.South. Supreme Courtroom decision in Miranda five. Arizona, holding i.(d).
9. ^ Willing, Richard (June x, 2016). "The right to remain silent, brought you lot by J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI". The Washington Mail.
10. ^ State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 176, 450 P.2d 364, 366 (1969).
11. ^ ^{a b c} Lief, Michael S.; H. Mitchell Caldwell (Aug–Sep 2006). "Yous Have The Right To Remain Silent". American Heritage. Archived from the original on 2009-02-06. Retrieved 2011-08-24 .
12. ^ State 5. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364 (1969)
13. ^ 396 U.South. 868 (1969).
14. ^ "Miranda Slain; Principal Effigy in Landmark Suspects' Rights Case". The New York Times. February 1, 1976. Retrieved May 12, 2010.
15. ^ Charles Montaldo, Miranda Rights and Warning: Landmark Example Evolved from 1963 Ernesto Miranda Arrest, most.com; accessed thirteen June 2014.
16. ^ "The Police force: Catching Up with Miranda". Time. March 3, 1967. Retrieved April 9, 2020.
17. ^ "The Miranda Conclusion: Criminal Wrongs, Citizen Rights". The Washington Post. Baronial 7, 1983. Retrieved April 9, 2020.
18. ^ "What Are Your Miranda Rights". ExpertLaw. 2017-05-01. Retrieved 2017-05-01 .
19. ^ See, e.yard., "Colorado five. Jump, 479 U.Due south. 564, 856-57 (1987)". Google Scholar . Retrieved 18 March 2018.
20. ^ Edwards, H. Lynn (1966). "The Furnishings of Miranda on the Work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation". American Criminal Law Quarterly. 159: 160–161. Retrieved 18 March 2018.
21. ^ "Miranda Waiver" (PDF). Academy Police Section. University of North Alabama. Retrieved 18 March 2018.
22. ^ "Handcuffing the Cops: Miranda'southward Harmful Effects on Police force Enforcement | NCPA". 2015-05-eighteen. Archived from the original on 2015-05-18. Retrieved 2016-09-28 . {{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
23. ^ "Cite Miranda And Become Costless". Sarasota Periodical. 31 May 1968. p. vii.
24. ^ People vs. Davis, S056425.
25. ^ Einesman, Floralynn (1999). "Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and Multifariousness". Journal of Criminal Police force and Criminology. xc (i): 1–48 [p. 41]. doi:ten.2307/1144162. JSTOR 1144162. NCJ 182327.
26. ^ United states Courtroom of Appeals, 9th Circuit (May 5, 1998), Us of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Rosario GARIBAY, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. No. 96-50606. , retrieved February 15, 2017
27. ^ "Missouri v. Seibert, department VI". Archived from the original on May 25, 2009. Retrieved 2010-05-07 . Hosted past Knuckles Academy School of Law.
28. ^ Berghuis five. Thompkins, 560 U.Due south. 370 (2010).
29. ^ Duke, Steven B. (2007). "Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?". Chapman Police force Review. 10 (3): 551. Retrieved 14 January 2020.
30. ^ Cassell, Paul G. (19 August 2011). "Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment". Northwestern University Law Review. 90 (two). Retrieved 14 January 2020.
31. ^ Fairness and effectiveness in policing : the bear witness. National Academies Printing. 2004. ISBN0309084334.
32. ^ Cassell, Paul G.; Fowles, Richard (2017). "Still Handcuffing the Cops: A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda'due south Harmful Furnishings on Law Enforcement". Brigham Young Law Review. 97: 685. Retrieved 14 Jan 2020.
33. ^ Alschuler, Albert W. (2017). "Miranda's Fourfold Failure". Boston Constabulary Review. 97: 649. Retrieved xiv January 2020.

• LaFave, Wayne R.; Israel, Jerold H.; King, Nancy J.; Kerr, Orin S. (2015). Criminal Process (quaternary ed.). St. Paul: Westward Bookish Publishing. OCLC 934517477.
• Saltzburg, Stephen A.; Capra, Daniel J. (2018). American Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary (11th ed.). St. Paul: W Academic. ISBN978-1683289845.

Further reading [edit]

• Baker, Liva (1983). Miranda: Crime, law, and politics . New York: Atheneum. ISBN978-0-689-11240-9.
• Kassin, Saul M.; Norwick, Rebecca J. (2004). "Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Ability of Innocence". Constabulary and Human Behavior. 28 (2): 211–221. CiteSeerXx.1.1.334.983. doi:10.1023/B:LAHU.0000022323.74584.f5. PMID 15141779. S2CID 18578057.
• Levy, Leonard Westward. (1986) [1969]. Origins of the 5th Subpoena (Reprint ed.). New York: Macmillan. ISBN978-0-02-919580-2.
• Soltero, Carlos R. (2006). "Miranda v. Arizona (1966) and the rights of the criminally accused". Latinos and American Law: Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. pp. 61–74. ISBN978-0-292-71411-three.
• Stuart, Gary L. (2004). Miranda: The Story of America'southward Correct to Remain Silent. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press. ISBN978-0-8165-2313-9.

External links [edit]

• Works related to Miranda 5. Arizona at Wikisource
• Text of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) is bachelor from:Cornell CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral statement audio)
• "Supreme Courtroom Landmark Case Miranda v. Arizona" from C-SPAN'south Landmark Cases: Historic Supreme Court Decisions
• An online publication titled "Miranda v. Arizona: The Rights to Justice" containing the about salient documents and other primary and secondary sources from the Law Library of Congress

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miranda_v._Arizona

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